Lebanon, Hezbollah and sovereignty held hostage: why Israel is right, and Washington has changed strategy
di David Marini
Israel considers the Lebanese front a strategic threat because Beirut lacks effective territorial control. Although Lebanon is recognized as a sovereign state, its authority is inconsistent. Hezbollah operates independently in military, intelligence, financial, and foreign policy matters, preventing unified state control. Ultimately, power rests with those who control the weapons.
HEZBOLLAH, IRAN AND ISRAEL’S SECURITY
Hezbollah serves as Iran’s main proxy in the Levant, receiving funding, training, and supplies from Tehran and the Quds Force. In March 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned sixteen individuals and entities for diverting over $100 million to Hezbollah since 2020. That same month, Hezbollah resumed hostilities against Israel, acting independently of Beirut. Tehran supplies resources, Lebanon faces instability, and Israel confronts direct security threats.
Israel argues that no government should accept a parallel armed force operating outside the control of a neighboring state. Article 51 of the UN Charter permits self-defense after armed attacks, but its application to non-state actors in another country is debated and limited. Legal principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction restrict the use of force. The pro-Israel stance is not that all military actions are justified, but that ongoing attacks on civilians make it unreasonable to expect Israel to rely on Beirut or non-coercive measures for its defense. American support strengthens Israel’s capabilities but does not override these legal constraints.
THE UNITED STATES: FROM MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO COERCION
For Washington, Lebanon is a strategic priority where Israel’s security, Iran’s containment, freedom of navigation, alliance credibility, and financial system integrity intersect. The February 2025 NSPM-2 memorandum formalized a “maximum pressure” strategy: prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, reduce its oil exports, target sanctions evasion, and restrict resources to the IRGC and its proxies. Hezbollah, designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US since 1997, is seen as an extension of Iran’s influence, not just a Lebanese issue. The legal basis for US operations remains debated, but the strategic message is clear. Washington now treats Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, and proxy network as an integrated threat. For Israel, this provides strategic depth, intelligence, missile defense, and diplomatic support. For Tehran, using Hezbollah as a low-cost insurance policy now risks direct consequences inside Iran. For Lebanon, it means it can no longer host an Iranian ally’s arsenal without becoming a battleground in the US-Iran rivalry.
WHY ISRAEL IS AMERICA’S ANCHOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Contrary to some European perspectives, the United States views Israel as a strategic force multiplier, not a passive beneficiary. Israel is not protected by a NATO-style mutual defense treaty and does not replace US bases in the Gulf. Instead, it operates as an autonomous, technologically advanced military capable of intelligence gathering, long-range strikes, and absorbing initial attacks without requiring significant US ground forces. Its geographic position allows effective monitoring of Syria, Lebanon, Suez routes, and Iranian activities. Since 2021, Israel’s inclusion in CENTCOM has improved joint planning and interoperability with regional partners.
The second reason is military and technical cooperation. The 2019-2028 memorandum commits the US to $38 billion in support: $33 billion for Foreign Military Financing and $5 billion for missile defense. Congress requires the US to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge. Systems like Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow serve as platforms for developing and testing advanced defense technologies. This collaboration yields valuable data on missile and drone threats. In April 2024, US, Israeli, and partner forces jointly intercepted a large-scale Iranian attack, demonstrating the effectiveness of integrated deterrence.
The third reason involves industrial, technological, and financial cooperation. US military assistance supports procurement, co-production, and standardization, benefiting the US defense industry while also integrating Israeli innovation. Collaboration extends to cybersecurity, energy, water, sensors, and applied research through joint programs. Since 1985, when Israel signed a free trade agreement with the US, bilateral trade has grown significantly, reaching about $55 billion in goods and services in 2024 and $34.4 billion in goods alone in 2025. While not critical to the US economy, these ties strengthen capital, technology, and supply chain connections.
The fourth reason is strategic deterrence. Israel’s presence ensures that aggression by Iran or its proxies will face a credible response, even if the US prefers to avoid direct involvement. Israel acts independently and can influence US decisions, which forces Tehran to consider both US and Israeli responses. This autonomy, combined with institutional stability, strong military ties, bipartisan Congressional support, and deep societal connections, reinforces the partnership. While there are costs for Washington, such as reputational risks and political challenges, US administrations have consistently valued the benefits of this relationship. Israel serves as a strategic anchor, not an unconditional beneficiary.
INTERNAL WARS, COALITIONS AND PERSONAL OPPORTUNISM
The issue predates Hezbollah. The 1975-1990 civil war fragmented Lebanon into militias and competing sovereignties. The Taif Accords restored institutions and called for disarmament, but Hezbollah kept its arsenal under the banner of “resistance.” The confessional system—a Maronite president, Sunni prime minister, and Shia speaker—maintains communal balance but entrenches quotas, patronage, and vetoes. Political dynasties and long-standing leaders have outlasted policy programs.
Following Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005, the March 8 and March 14 blocs split Lebanon between the Syria-Iran axis and a pro-Western front. Coalitions remain alliances of convenience, shifting for political gain or external support. In May 2008, when the government challenged Hezbollah’s private network, armed members occupied West Beirut, reinforcing political vetoes with military force. The Doha Agreement ended the clashes, formalizing a balance imposed by strength.
Personal opportunism is a structural feature: leaders protect their communities, socialize costs, and privatize political support and resources. The Lebanese people are the primary victims. The World Bank cites “elite capture” as a source of fragility. By late 2024, real GDP had dropped nearly 40 percent since 2019, and the lira lost over 98 percent of its value. A projected 3.5 percent rebound in 2025 does not offset the collapse: debt remains near 155 percent of GDP, Lebanon is excluded from capital markets, and the banking crisis persists. When credit and services fail, sectarian networks replace welfare and foster political dependency. The US can support the Lebanese Armed Forces, sanction opaque networks, and condition reconstruction, but it cannot create a ruling class willing to forgo entrenched benefits.
UNIFIL’S FAILURE AND THE LIMITS OF PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
Its outcomes and mandate should be evaluated for UNIFIL. Resolution 1701 (2006) called for Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in the south and a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani free of unauthorized armed personnel and weapons. Nearly twenty years later, Hezbollah has rebuilt its military capabilities and clandestine infrastructure. UNIFIL patrolled, facilitated liaison, and supported communities, but could not search all private property or forcibly disarm militias. Access restrictions, a limited mandate, and lack of Lebanese political will undermined Resolution 1701’s goals. This reflects a failure of the political-military framework, not individual peacekeepers. The US now favors a strategy based on sequencing, verification, and consequences: disarmament and state control before Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction.
ITALY IN LEBANON: TACTICAL PRESENCE, MARGINAL STRATEGIC LEVERAGE
UNIFIL’s final extension through 31 December 2026, with withdrawal by the end of 2027, is not an admission of failure but signals the end of a model that failed to prevent rearmament. In July 2026, the mission included 7,448 troops from 47 countries, including 740 Italians. Rome authorizes up to 1,256 troops and in 2026 provides both the Force Commander, Diodato Abagnara, and the Sector West commander, Andrea Fraticelli. Italy plays a significant role within UNIFIL but has limited influence on decisive outcomes. It cannot determine Hezbollah’s actions, control Tehran, enforce disarmament, or set guarantees for Israel. In contrast, Washington wields extraterritorial sanctions, military leverage, a special relationship with Israel, and the ability to broker political agreements. Equating Italian tactical command with American geopolitical influence creates a misleading national narrative.
WHY ISRAEL CANNOT RELY ON BEIRUT’S PROMISES
Lebanon cannot restore its sovereignty through declarations, unconditional funding, or repeating past missions. It needs exclusive control of arms, Lebanese Armed Forces authority across the territory, verifiable dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, and a monitored border. Reconstruction and state-building aid should be linked to measurable progress, while humanitarian assistance remains protected. The Lebanese government’s 2026 decision to declare Hezbollah’s military activities illegal is a positive step; effective implementation will be the true measure.
The Trilateral Framework Agreement signed on 26 June 2026 by the United States, Israel, and Lebanon is a significant step toward replacing promises with verifiable actions: disarmament of non-state groups, dismantling of infrastructure, deployment of vetted Lebanese forces, phased Israeli withdrawal, and US-facilitated military coordination. It also implicitly acknowledges that Resolution 1701 was insufficient. Washington provides support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and humanitarian aid, but ties Israel’s withdrawal to Beirut’s concrete actions. Significant risks remain: Hezbollah seeks to retain its weapons, Iran may undermine the agreement, and Lebanese elites could accept aid while delaying reforms.
Until disarmament is verified, Israel cannot rely on UN statements or Beirut’s assurances for the security of Haifa, Galilee, and the north. Stability requires both sides to control all weapons within their territories. In Lebanon, legal authority exists but is not fully enforced. Israel is bound by international humanitarian law but must prioritize its citizens’ security and cannot delegate defense to ineffective mechanisms. The US has now adopted this approach as policy. Success depends on Washington maintaining consistent pressure on Iran, financially constraining Hezbollah, selectively supporting the Lebanese state, and avoiding unconditional support for either Beirut or Jerusalem.
Article by David Marini — Senior Business Development Manager and analyst specializing in geoeconomics and international finance.
